New Delhi, June 6 (IANS) The Pakistan establishment’s reported move to enlist the support of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) in its fight against the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) appears to be yielding unintended consequences, with signs that the strategy may be backfiring.
The ISKP, which operates as the Islamic State Pakistan Province (ISPP) in Pakistan, seems to have backtracked from its plan of helping the security forces.
An official said Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus failed to gauge the scale and pace of the ISPP’s expansion across the country. As a result, the security landscape in both Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan has become increasingly complex, with multiple militant groups operating in the region. The ISPP has now emerged as a significant player in these conflict zones, the official added.
An Intelligence Bureau official said, “The Pakistani Intelligence agencies and the security forces gave too much priority to the TTP and BLA and in the bargain failed to realise that the ISPP and outfits such as the Ittehad Mujahideen-e- Pakistan (IMP) had been expanding.”
According to the official, the ISPP capitalised on the shortcomings of Pakistan’s intelligence network and expanded its footprint with little scrutiny. In fact, the intelligence agencies in Pakistan spoke only about the threats posed by the BLA and TTP. There was not a single dedicated intelligence assessment or report highlighting the threat posed by the ISPP, the official claimed.
Another official said that the rate at which the ISPP is growing is a matter of serious concern for the region. The Islamic State, which is the parent organisation, is an international terrorist group. This has made the ISPP more lucrative for many terrorists operating in the region.
Although the ISPP began operations in 2015 in Pakistan’s KP and Balochistan regions, the real push began in 2025. This was around the same time that the TTP and BLA clashed heavily with the Pakistani security forces. The establishment was so busy with these groups that it failed to gather any intelligence on the ISPP, officials say.
It was during this period that the ISPP began reaching out to disaffected members within the TTP and actively sought to recruit them. The effort reportedly proved successful, with more than 100 disgruntled operatives joining its ranks.
Officials say the ISPP is backed by substantial financial resources, giving it considerable operational flexibility. The Islamic State is a transnational operator, and this has helped in bringing in funds in large numbers. Officials also note that the group makes effective use of its publications, including newsletters and magazines, to expand its reach and influence. Its latest magazine, “Invade,” was launched to engage a wider international audience and strengthen its global outreach.
With ample funding and an expanding international network, the ISPP has stepped up the frequency of its attacks in Pakistan, with security personnel and state assets emerging as its principal targets. According to another official, most large-scale attacks are currently concentrated in KP and Balochistan. However, there are concerns that the group may seek to extend its operations into other parts of the country.
“If that happens, Islamabad could face a far more complex security challenge that may prove increasingly difficult to contain,” the official warned.
The official said the ISPP has been able to exploit what he described as a major weakness in Pakistan’s security apparatus, namely the failure of its intelligence network to accurately identify emerging threats. As a result, several attacks attributed to the TTP in intelligence assessments were, in fact, carried out by the ISPP, the official claimed.
Officials say that the ISPP has its road map laid out. The main intention is to weaken the government in Pakistan and hit the security forces hard. The incidents of sectarian violence, suicide bombings, and targeted murders are on the rise.
In addition to Balochistan and KP, the ISPP has been fast expanding in Quetta as well. The outfit has a set of very resilient fighters who are backed by funds, digital reach, and modern infrastructure.
Observers say that the Pakistan establishment and the army, in particular, made a mistake in trusting the ISPP. They managed to convince the top leadership to help them in Balochistan and KP. The May 5 murder of Deobandi cleric Sheikh Idrees Tarangzai in KP was a signal that the cadres were not happy with the alignment with Pakistan.
It was Sheikh who would meet with the top leadership and urge them to join the security forces. Post these meetings, he would praise the Pakistan army and Field Marshal Asim Munir. The murder was a message that the Islamic State Pakistan Province would not back the Pakistan security forces, and it would treat Islamabad as an enemy and not an ally, the experts point out.
–IANS
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